It can be said with some certainty that the communal tensions that erupted in Kaptanganj village of Sunsari district in July 2026 and the violent protests that followed were not wholly unexpected given the increasingly volatile situation in southern Nepal. Religion-based political mobilisation, religious bigotry, growing fanaticism, and the frequent spread of misinformation have created conditions that could trigger communal violence at any time.
The Kaptanganj incident was only one of many religious clashes that have occurred in recent years, and the primary reason it got wider attention was the death of three locals. Otherwise, it may have been dismissed as yet another instance of underlying religious tensions boiling over. The frequency and intensity of communal incidents have increased to such an extent that people have been internalising such episodes as recurrent occurrences despite being well aware of the harmful consequences of communal violence.
The conflagration
After police firing killed one individual in Kaptanganj, anti-Muslim protests spread to different urban centres across Madhesh province. Although state security forces were responsible for the death, Hindu protestors targeted local Muslim communities, resulting in violence and the destruction of property. The situation turned so perilous that the home minister himself visited Kaptanganj and other affected areas in an effort to restore order.
A number of Hindu nationalist organisations and groups active and responsible for the violent protests portrayed their actions as necessary ‘revenge’ for the death of Hindu men in Kaptanganj. On 1 and 2 August 2026, Home Minister Sudan Gurung met with representatives of the Samyukta Hindu Morcha (Joint Hindu Front) as a part of the government’s initiative to pacify the violence. Hindu nationalist organisations, namely, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Hindu Samrat Sena Nepal (HSSN), Vairav Yuwa Committee, Rastriya Bajrang Dal, and Janaki Sena handed over a petition to Gurung.
Among these, HSSN came into the limelight because of its name, which includes the word ‘sena’ (army), and its leading role in the protests and subsequent negotiations. While the existence and activities of the HSSN may have come as a revelation to some observers, it is in fact one of the most active Hindu nationalist organisations in the Tarai belt, particularly in Madhesh. The organisation’s primary objective is the reinstatement of Nepal as a Hindu nation, and it therefore identifies itself as a Hindu nationalist organisation. In fact, when MP Harka Sampang of the Shramshakti Party questioned in parliament whether a sena is even legally permissible to operate, HSSN leader Krishna Yadav responded that while the Nepal Army is responsible for defending the country, the HSSN exists to guard the Hindu religion and tradition.
Home Minister Gurung’s twice-held meetings with HSSN leaders highlighted its growing prominence. During my fieldwork in March 2026 in different districts of Madhesh, I frequently heard of Samrat Sena from both Hindus and Muslims. Muslims as well as Hindus who stood against religious animosity pointed to it as the main Hindu organisation responsible for anti-Muslim attacks whereas Hindus supporting the idea of a ‘Hindu nation’ spoke approvingly of the HSSN and its activities.
The HSSN
Registered as ‘Hindu Samrat Nepal’ (Hindu Emperor Nepal) with the Dhanusha District Administration Office, the HSSN is a relatively new Hindu nationalist organisation, formally established toward the end of 2021. Almost all its members are youth, not older than 35–40 years of age. Rajesh Sanatani (formerly Yadav), the head of the HSSN, holds a degree in mechanical engineering from Phonics University in Uttarakhand, India. His adopted surname, Sanatani, meaning ‘one who follows the eternal religion [Hinduism]’, reflects a naming practice that is becoming increasingly common within the organisation. He stated that many teachers and staff in his college in India were associated with Indian Hindu nationalist organisations and introduced him to the Hindutva idea.
Sanatani claims it was the worldwide rise of rightist politics that encouraged him to form an organisation to unite youths with the commitment to defend Hindu nationhood, which, he believed, was in a dire state in the 2010s. In an interview I took at the HSSN office in Janakpur, he said: ‘Islamisation and Christianisation of Nepali society were accelerating at high speed, and there were few people concerned about such activities. Nepal won’t retain its existence when we lose Hindu-ness. So, we, like-minded youths, came together and started the Hindu Samrat Sena.’
It was social media posts that brought like-minded youths together and consequently led to the organisation that later evolved into the HSSN. As Rajanis Raj Pandey, a central committee member of the HSSN, said: ‘I used to post my concerns and opinions about Hindutva and marginalisation of Hindus in Nepal on Facebook and TikTok. Over time, I found that there are other youths like me who share similar ideas. We started communicating through social media and finally decided to come together to build this organisation.’
During field visits, I found the HSSN to be one of the most active and militant Hindu nationalist organisations in Madhesh and the eastern Tarai districts, even in the most rural areas. It has been involved in various communal incidents across Madhesh, one way or the other. For instance, in Rupaithe Village of Janakpurdham Submetropolitan City, tensions between local Hindu and Muslim groups erupted in October 2025 after the two sides had a heated debate over the ownership of a local pond. Locally, that was not a new issue, but according to resident Muslims, that year it turned into a violent clash after youths from the HSSN intervened. In his defence, Sanatani presented the involvement of the HSSN as a response against stone-pelting allegedly carried out by Muslims during a local Hindu festival.
Organisational structure
According to Sanatani, the HSSN has a formal presence in 10 districts of the Tarai and major cities like Biratnagar and Kathmandu. It has established networks with local Hindu nationalist organisations and activists throughout Nepal and abroad, particularly among Nepali immigrant workers in the Gulf. However, the HSSN’s activities are centred mainly in the districts of Dhanusha, Mahottari, Siraha, Sarlahi, Saptari, Bara, and Rautahat.
The HSSN has three categories of membership: general, active, and lifetime. Members are obliged to pay a monthly levy of NPR 100 for general membership and NPR 200 for active membership, and although the organisation’s documents provide for lifetime membership, this provision has not yet been implemented in practice. The HSSN also has separate affiliated bodies for Hindu sadhus, women, medical personnel, and teachers, each working in their respective sectors. Although district and municipal committees also meet in person, most meetings are held via online platforms, with WhatsApp being the most popular.
Dispensing ‘justice’
The HSSN has linked its activities closely with the Hindu population at the local level, including through a separate committee that deals particularly with personal and family problems and provides quasi-judicial services. The Nyaya tatha Chhanbin Samiti (Justice and Investigation Committee) receives complaints from applicants and, on that basis, summons the disputants and holds discussions before arriving at a conclusion. A review of its complaint form indicates that the Nyaya tatha Chhanbin Samiti deals with a diverse range of issues such as domestic violence, physical assault, religious conversion, cattle smuggling, dowry, ‘love jihad’, cow slaughter, defamation, rape, vandalism, blackmail, threat, monetary transactions, among others.
Although leaders of the HSSN claim that the Nyaya tatha Chhanbin Samiti is intended to provide justice to victims in general, in practice, it appears to function as a mechanism for protecting and supporting Hindus. It is particularly active in cases framed as involving ‘Muslim intervention’ such as ‘love jihad’, religious conversion, and cattle smuggling. Chandan Jha, a member of the Samiti, described how his team has punished local Muslims for their ‘crimes’ such as eloping with Hindu girls, not returning borrowed money on time, etc. He said in cases where they are not able to resolve issues, they hand them over to the local police. The examples he shared to illustrate the activities of the Samiti seemed to portray Muslims as the perpetrators always and the Hindus as victims.
In Birgunj, an English teacher in a local secondary school recounted seeking the support of a local Hindu nationalist organisation to resolve a family land dispute with a Muslim neighbour, which, according to him, worked to ‘bring Muslims into their size’. This example illustrates the manner in which the HSSN is trying to cultivate an image of a justice-provider to Hindus to attract more Hindus into its ambit, fostering a sense of empowerment and solidarity among local Hindus, and reinforcing its organisational influence within the community.
Working among Dalits to stop conversion
The HSSN works among different layers of the Hindu population, including Dalits, with the objective of preventing religious conversion from Hinduism to Christianity and Islam. Aware that the persistence of untouchability and other forms of discrimination against Dalit communities has been one of the reasons for religious conversion in Nepal, the HSSN has attempted to include Dalit youths into its organisational networks while discouraging discriminatory practices against them. In the words of Sanatani: ‘Whenever we visit the home of a Dalit, without any hesitation, we drink water and eat what they offer. Such acts build trust and they feel respected. Our small act could stop them from changing their religion and strengthen their faith in Hinduism.’
Yet, Dalit inclusion in the HSSN seems largely tokenistic, serving more to project an image of inclusivity than to ensure meaningful representation. Among the leaders I met during fieldwork, none belonged to Dalit communities, most were from Tarai Brahman and Yadav backgrounds.
Pro-Monarchist, Hindu nationalist
The HSSN advocates the restoration of the monarchical system in Nepal as it believes that only the monarchy can ensure political stability and preserve Nepal’s identity as a Hindu nation. It argues that a Hindu nation without the monarchy would be unstable because it leaves open the possibility for adherents of other religions to become the head of state. In Sanatani’s words, ‘The HSSN wants a Hindu nation with monarchy. The king is the incarnation of Lord Vishnu. We imagine Ram Rajya, and when we think about Ram Rajya, the king is mandatory.’
To this end, the HSSN has been working with other pro-monarchy Hindu nationalist organisations in Nepal for the re-establishment of a ‘Hindu Adhirajya’ (Hindu Kingdom). The HSSN was also part of the so-called Joint People’s Movement Committee formed in 2025 to campaign for the restoration of both the Hindu nation and the monarchy. However, the HSSN leaders view many organisations within the alliance as insufficiently militant in pushing their agenda. According to them, pro-monarchy political parties such as the Rastriya Prajatantra Party are not genuinely committed to the agendas of restoring the Hindu nation and the monarchy, but instead use these issues primarily for electoral gain and political bargaining.
Election politics
Leaders of the HSSN participated in the 2026 election under the banner of Nepalka Lagi Nepali Party, i.e., ‘Nepalis for Nepal Party’, a monarchist party led by Balkrishna Neupane, a known monarchist. Established in 2022, the party has adopted ‘Prithvipath’ and Nepalvad’ (Nepal-ism), which, according to Neupane, are principles propounded by King Prithvi Narayan Shah that promote a Nepal-first policy. In the 2022 election, it fielded 110 candidates under the FPTP and PR systems but failed to win any seat.
Among the candidates from Madhesh were Krishna Yadav, the HSSN’s Vice-Chair contesting from Sarlahi–2; Rajnish Raj Pandey, Central Committee leader and spokesperson, from Mahottari–3; and Chandan Kumar Jha, another Central leader contesting from Dhanusha–3. The votes they received barely crossed the four-digit mark and the HSSN leaders pointed to the pro-Balendra Shah wave that swept across parts of the Tarai as the reason for their electoral failure. Nevertheless, they did not view the electoral setback as a rejection of their broader agenda of restoring Nepal as a Hindu kingdom. Rather, they regarded participation in the election as a means of expanding their organisational networks and promoting the cause of a Hindu nation.
After Kaptanganj
In addition to demands related to the victims of the Kaptanganj incident, the 13-point petition submitted to the home minister under the banner of the Samyukta Hindu Morcha called for a high-level investigation into the incident; monitoring of mosques; investigations into foreign networks and funding linked to mosques; reinstatement of Nepal as a Vedic Hindu nation in the constitution; the dissolution of the Muslim Commission; a complete ban on madrasas; a ban on the use of loudspeakers in mosques across Nepal; deportation of Rohingya, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani ‘infiltrators’; and an investigation into the citizenship certificates issued to Muslims after 1990.
The Home Minister’s meeting with the HSSN leaders and, according to the organisation’s public statements in media interviews and social media posts, an informal understanding to hold discussions with political parties on the restoration of the Hindu nation within three months appear to have emboldened the HSSN and other Hindu nationalist organisations. This development has further strengthened efforts to expand campaigns advocating the restoration of a Hindu state.
More recently, the HSSN has intensified its social media outreach to expand into the Nepal’s hill regions through online membership drives. This reflects the organisation’s recognition of the limits its existing reach and its desire to develop a nationwide presence as a major monarchist Hindu nationalist movement.
Conclusion
The recurring communal tensions in the Tarai region pose a significant security challenge and undermine social cohesion. Religio-political organisations such as the HSSN actively contribute to creating conditions that foster communal division and increase social distance between local communities. The HSSN is simultaneously advocating for the restoration of the monarchy and a Hindu state while drawing on elements of the Indian Hindutva model to construct non-Hindu communities as the ‘other’. This strategy appears intended to consolidate Hindu identity, thereby contributing to the spread of Hindu nationalist narratives and increasing the risk of communal polarisation. The organisation’s militant character, coupled with the active involvement of young supporters in leadership and mobilisation, raises concerns about the potential for future communal tensions. Equally concerning is the state’s engagement with these organisations, which may be perceived as legitimising their efforts to expand Hindutva-oriented political narratives.
